The economic and political crisis in Athens

The Economic and Political Crisis in Athens

Predispositions that did conduce to the more recent reformation of the socio-political structure in ancient Athens.

The tribulations that did compel the opposing factions to nominate Solon as mediator in the year 594 had their roots firmly planted in the seventh century (699–600). That discontent prevailed within Athens may be ascertained by the endeavour to establish a tyranny circa 630 by the Olympic victor Cylon, who was aided by his father-in-law, Theagenes, the tyrant of Megara. This coup, however, proved abortive, either because the people's plight was not so dire as to persuade them to lend their wholehearted support to a tyrant, or because they resented, owing to their antipathy towards the Megarians, a Megarian-backed coup. Soon after this in circa 621, possibly as a reaction to Cylon, Draco's Law Code was promulgated. Scant indeed is our knowledge of this code of laws, and it seems exceedingly probable that the exhaustive description of its provisions in Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* (section 4) was a later invention. It most assuredly dealt with the crime of homicide, and may have laid down the regulations for or even instituted the status of the 'hectemoroi' (one-sixth-parters). Its frequent recourse to the death penalty as a form of chastisement rendered the law code proverbial for its harshness:

Plutarch, Solon 17.2

Therefore Demades later on gained fame when he said that Draco had written his laws not in ink, but in blood.

Nevertheless, this may yet be construed in retrospect as the inaugural step on the road to democracy, as the publication of the laws curtailed the power of the aristocrats to interpret the law in a purely arbitrary fashion, which had been the subject of bitter complaints by Hesiod in circa 700 BC.

By 594, the civil discord between the notables ('gnorimoi') and the multitude ('plethos') had reached such a fever pitch that both sides were amenable to appointing Solon as a mediator to resolve the economic and political crisis, which would inevitably conduce to tyranny, unless a solution could be discovered. Aristotle succinctly summarises the problems that confronted Solon:

Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 2.2–3

After this [i.e. Cylon's attempted tyranny] it happened that a protracted period of civil strife took place between the notables (gnorimoi) and the multitude (plethos). For their constitution was in all ways oligarchic; moreover the poor and their children and wives were enslaved by the rich. They were called pelatai and hectemoroi (one-sixth parters). For, in return for this rent, they worked the fields of the rich – the whole land was in the hands of a few – and if they did not pay their rents, they themselves and their children became liable to seizure as slaves ('agogimoi'). All borrowing was based on the debtor's person as security until the time of Solon – he was the first to become the champion of the people. This slavery, sanctioned under the constitution, was to the people the harshest and most bitter feature of the regime, although they were also discontented about everything else, for they had virtually no share in government.

The employment of the word 'enslaved' ought not necessarily to be taken *ad litteram*, as it could encompass any status that involved subjection or dependence upon another. However, it is Aristotle's deceptively simple pronouncements regarding the economic problems that have engendered much scholarly debate and disagreement concerning the nature of land tenure and of debt in pre-Solonian Athens.

The initial problem concerns the identity of the *pelatai* and the *hectemoroi*: are these alternative appellations for the same class of people, or are these two discrete classes? Later writers, including Plato (*Euthyphro* 4c), consider the *pelatai* to be synonymous with 'thetes,' *viz.*, a class of free men who labour for others; and Plutarch (*Solon* 13.2) equates the *hectemoroi* with the *thetes*. Thus, the most probable answer is that *pelatai* was a general term or denomination to encompass all types of dependent agricultural labourers; and that the *hectemoroi*, who were obliged to pay one-sixth of their crop, were one particular type of *pelatai*. A far more complex problem pertains to debt, upon which Aristotle in the aforementioned quotation and other later writers concentrated: were the *hectemoroi* in this position because they had fallen into debt through borrowing – if so, how had this situation arisen? Or should the *hectemoroi* be regarded as a separate group, not to be associated with the 'borrowers' who, as Aristotle states above, used their own persons as security for their debt?

One theory posits that the *hectemoroi* were previously independent small landowners, but, having fallen upon hard times due to unfavourable harvests, had mortgaged their land as security for borrowing. When they were unable to repay the debt, their creditors kept them tied to the land as dependent agricultural labourers, who paid them one-sixth of their crop with no specific date set to terminate this dependent status. The mortgaging of their land was probably marked by 'horoi' (marker stones), which Solon mentions in his poem concerning the freeing of the land. Eventually, many *hectemoroi*, who had previously found it difficult to subsist even when they had full possession of their land, now found it impossible to live on five-sixths of their crop, and defaulted in their payment of one-sixth to their creditor. The result was both the loss of their land to and enslavement by their creditor, who was legally entitled to sell the former *hectemoroi* abroad as slaves.

Two other theories have been advanced to lend credence to this interpretation. The first centres around the introduction of coinage, which facilitated borrowing for the poor but rendered repayment more arduous, especially with a high fixed rate of interest; previously, in pre-coinage days, the loan had been in the form of food, seed, or farm animals, thus setting a reasonable limit to the amount of debt and making repayment a genuine possibility. The second theory is predicated on the dramatic growth of population in Attica in the eighth century. The division of land between too many sons (Hesiod had advised farmers to have only one son) and the consequent need to overwork the reduced land-holding to feed the increasing numbers led to soil exhaustion and a smaller yield of crops; it was this lack of sufficient crops to sustain his family that led the farmer onto the slippery slope of *hectemoroi* status and worse.

Attractive as this interpretation might appear, there are serious objections to it. Aristotle in the aforementioned quotation does seem to be drawing a distinction between a class of *hectemoroi* who pay rent as tenants, and a class of borrowers who pledge their persons as security for their loan. Plutarch is even more explicit about the distinction:

Plutarch, Solon 13.2

All the people were in debt ('hupochreos') to the rich. For they either farmed their lands for them and paid one-sixth of the produce, being called 'hectemoroi' or thetes; or they took out loans on the security of their person and were liable to seizure by their creditors – some of the debtors becoming enslaved at home, others being sold as slaves in foreign countries.

At first sight, this quotation would seem to include the *hectemoroi* among the debtors, but the Greek word 'hupochreos' can also mean 'under obligation to,' 'dependent on'; and this must be the correct translation, as Plutarch immediately makes a clear distinction between the *hectemoroi* who pay rent to the rich and the debtors who pledge their persons to the rich. It is also a fact that Solon in his surviving poems never mentions debt as a cause of the plight of the *hectemoroi*.

In addition, one-sixth of the produce seems a very small rate of return for the creditor; a half or more would be expected, as the Helots paid to their Spartan masters (Tyrtaeus fr. 6). It also seems hard to believe that all the creditors came together and agreed a uniform rate of interest rather than a variety of rates. Furthermore, this interpretation argues that the peasant farmers underwent two stages of borrowing and of default. It would be very naive on the part of the creditors to lend a second time to desperately poor peasant farmers (now *hectemoroi*), who had already failed to make a living with the full produce from their farms, even with the aid of the first loan; with one-sixth of their production already accounted for, the *hectemoroi* would inevitably default on the second loan. Finally, coinage did not become a factor in Athenian life until a generation after Solon, and small coinage, which is the usual means of transacting business among the poor, not until much later.

Other scholars, therefore, do not believe that the *hectemoroi* had come into existence through debt, but through hereditary serfdom. At some time in the past, the small landowners had voluntarily or semi-voluntarily accepted the status of being *hectemoroi*: they agreed to a quasi-feudal system, in which they would receive support and protection from the aristocrats in return for a share of their crop. This institution might go back as far as Mycenaean times when some form of conditional land tenure was standard. Alternatively, it may have arisen in the dangerous and unsettled Dark Ages (1200–900BC), or in the eighth century (799–700) when aristocratic power was at its peak and internal colonisation of Attica, led by the aristocrats, was taking place due to population growth.

The most recent and radical interpretation (by Rihll) puts forward the view that the *hectemoroi* system was introduced as a result of conflict about the use of public land, and had nothing to do with private land. It is argued that the right of individuals to cultivate any vacant or unused public land was causing problems for the community, which was also making greater demands on this land, for example, hunting, pasturing and social events. Therefore Draco, in his law code of circa 621/0, attempted to resolve this problem by establishing the *hectemoroi* system: the individual Athenian was allowed to cultivate public land, but compensated the community by the payment of one-sixth of the produce. The legal provision of seizure and slavery abroad upon default was included to ensure that the *hectemoroi* met their obligations. However, this system soon came to a crisis point as a result of the rich, who controlled the law, exploiting it for their own benefit – they ignored this law in their own and their friends' cases, thereby taking control of public property; but implemented the law with its full force against others, sometimes illegally.

If debt and Rihll's interpretation are put aside, then the institution of the *hectemoroi* had originated in the acceptance of hereditary serfdom by small landowners, but it was this system of 'conditional tenure' that the later writers did not fully understand. In a legally sophisticated society, such as Aristotle's Athens in the fourth century (399–300), definition of ownership was relatively precise; but in archaic Athens which had no written law-code until Draco's in 621/0, and that was very rudimentary, the issue of ownership was not so clear-cut. The peasant farmer 'owned' his land in the sense that he tilled the soil, as his ancestors had done, bequeathed it to his sons, and retained control of it, provided he paid his one-sixth dues. On the other hand, the local aristocrat also 'owned' the land in the sense that a one-sixth share of the produce was owed to him and, if it was not paid, he had the right to enslave the peasant farmer and take over his land. It was probably this ambiguity over land ownership that led Aristotle to speak of 'the whole land was in the hands of a few'.

This *hectemoroi* system appears to have worked satisfactorily for a long time, but by the time of Solon it had become a major cause of tension. In addition, there was still slavery for debt. Moreover, Aristotle's division of Athens into the rich and the poor, either *hectemoroi* or the enslaved, is too simplistic: there must have been a class of independent landowners, some affluent, some poor, who deeply resented the current situation in Athens. It was the economic and political grievances of these groups that had made Athens by 594 so politically unstable that a mediator was required to halt the slide into tyranny. What had gone awry?

It is clear from the poems of Solon that one of the major causes of the unrest was the greed of the rich:

Solon fr. 4 5–13

But the citizens themselves are willing in their stupidity to destroy this great city, believing in wealth. Unjust are the minds of the people's leaders who are going to endure many sufferings because of their great arrogance. For they do not know how to curb their greed … but they grow rich; believing in unjust deeds; sparing neither religious nor secular possessions, they steal right and left for plunder.

In order to comprehend part of the worsening economic situation in Athens, it is necessary to examine the nature of debt-bondage, although this too is an area of scholarly dispute. In non-monetary agrarian societies, and this can be verified from comparable near-eastern documents, the main aim of the creditor was to acquire the debtor's labour, thus increasing his stock of dependent agricultural labour, rather than make a quick profit through the charging of interest on the loan. Many of those who needed to borrow, being well aware of the creditor's desire and knowing the harshness of the debt law, if he defaulted (i.e. liable to seizure and to sale abroad as a slave), preferred to accept the status of debt-bondsman, by which he obligated himself and his family to work in servitude for the creditor until he worked off his debt. In other words, a man who would be unable or would find it extremely difficult to meet his obligation by payment offered his labour as alternative compensation. This put the debt-bondsmen and his family in the power of the creditor but, if it is accepted that the debt-bondage relationship was entered into at the beginning of the loan and not as a result of default, he and his family were protected from being seized and sold abroad as slaves. However, there were plenty of opportunities for abuse of this relationship by the creditor, if comparisons are made with the sufferings of Roman debt-bondsmen.

The upper class's desire for expensive luxury goods, their lavish and competitive life-style and the erection of public buildings at their own expense required access to much greater wealth than before – thus producing the incentive for exploitation. Solon mentions the stockpiling of silver and gold, the international means of exchange before coinage, by which the rich could finance their extravagant living (Plutarch, Solon 2). Thus it would appear from Solon's poem that the rich creditors were now taking full advantage of their position of power:

Solon in Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 12.4

I brought back to Athens, to their divinely-built homeland, those many men who had been sold abroad, some illegally, others legally, and those who had been forced into exile through pressing debt/dire necessity [the Greek is ambiguous], no longer using the Attic tongue, as they had wandered in so many places. I also freed those at home who were in shameful slavery and trembled before their masters' moods.

Although Solon's words are not explicit about the treatment of the different groups of the poor, it does seem evident that many Athenians, both defaulting *hectemoroi* and those who had borrowed on the security of their persons, had been enslaved and sold abroad; others had fled into exile to avoid this fate. Although this penalty was sanctioned by law and this enslavement probably reflects the increasing economic pressures of population growth and exhaustion of the land on the poor, the fact that many were sold abroad illegally shows that the rich, who controlled the law, were unscrupulously exploiting their legal power to enrich themselves. In addition, the rich appear to have either treated the debt-bondsman more harshly or worsened their terms of bondage. Thus the poor had pressing economic (and legal) reasons to look to Solon as their saviour.

It is also evident from Solon's reforms and Aristotle's comment about the nature of the constitution (*Ath. Pol.* 2) that there was also serious political disenchantment. The 'Eupatridai' (the Well-born), an exclusive group of aristocratic families, had reserved for themselves the top political posts and membership of the 'Areopagus' (the aristocratic council), thus ensuring a monopoly of power and thereby excluding other wealthy men from political office. In addition, the 'hoplite' middle class were virtually excluded from participation in the running of the state. The possession of political sovereignty by the hoplites in other states, such as in Sparta, must have been a source of great envy and motivation.

Finally, it may have been the case that the discontent of the *hectemoroi*, many of whom would have been hoplites, was not caused by economic concerns, but by their feelings of shame at their inferior, dependent status which included the humiliating threat of enslavement. The one-sixth payment was not financially demanding for many of them, but the *horoi* (marker stones) were a daily reminder of their political, social and economic subservience to an upper class which had little to offer in the way of protection in the age of hoplites. Thus all those outside the ranks of the Eupatridai wanted a redress of their grievances.