The reforms of Solon (Legal reforms)
The Reforms of Solon (Legal Reforms)
In Aristotle’s exposition of Solon’s reforms, he doth accentuate the three most ‘democratic’ features inherent within the new constitution.
First, the prohibition of debt involving the pledge of a person as security; and:
Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 9.1
secondly, that it was feasible for any person so inclined to prosecute on behalf of those who suffered injustice; and thirdly, which is reputed the chief power of the people, there was appeal to the ‘dikasterion’ (the People’s Court).
This ‘second’ legal reform did mark a signal alteration in the administration of the law. Previously, merely the injured party might seek justice and compensation before an Athenian magistrate, by bringing a ‘dike’ (a private prosecution); if, for whatsoever reason, they could not bring the case, there existed no avenue by which they might seek legal redress. Solon had now established the principle that certain crimes affected not merely the wronged individual, but also the public interest, and therefore that any member of the citizen public should possess the right to prosecute on behalf of the state. He accomplished this by laying a written charge (‘graphe’) before the magistrate, and this Greek word ‘graphe’ came to be employed for any public prosecution.
The ‘third’ legal reform granted the right of appeal to the ordinary Athenians. The Appeal Court was almost certainly the Ecclesia (the Assembly) sitting as a jury court, and in this capacity was known as the Heliaea (the People’s Court). However, scholarly dispute doth attend the manner in which the system of appeal functioned in practice. Some do opine that there existed no right of appeal from a magistrate’s judgement, should he keep the penalty within the limit prescribed by law; in this situation the magistrate’s judgement was final. But, should the magistrate wish to impose a higher penalty, he was obliged to refer the case to the Heliaea which would then decide to accept or reject the magistrate’s penalty.
Others have argued more convincingly that, albeit there were some minor cases wherein the magistrate’s judgement was final, Solon in a majority of cases granted to any dissatisfied defendant the right of appeal to the Heliaea against a magistrate’s judgement. The Heliaea then conducted a re-trial and passed its own judgement that over-ruled that of the magistrate. This is confirmed by Plutarch:
Plutarch, Solon 18.3
For Solon also gave to all those who desired it the right of appeal to the people’s court, even in the cases which he had assigned to the magistrates for them to judge.
Some scholars believe that Plutarch’s evidence is suspect on the grounds that its marked similarity to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 9) must mean that he used Aristotle as his sole source, and that any extra information is pure conjecture on the part of Plutarch. However, it is known that Plutarch did use other fourth-century evidence. Moreover, he did see the published laws of Solon (Solon 25), and included quotations from them (e.g. Solon 19); consequently there is every reason to have faith in the accuracy of his account. What is indisputable is the fact that this reform, for the first time, made the aristocratic magistrates accountable to the Athenian people for their legal decisions (Aristotle, Politics 1274a 15–18); and thus marked the first stage in the development of the people’s control over the legal system that culminated in the reforms of Ephialtes.