King Cleomenes

It may well have been this selfsame victory which emboldened the independent city-states of Epidaurus, Troezen, and Hermione, all situate within the Argolid, to forge military alliances with Sparta. This signal success against Arcadia and Argos did likewise bring the Spartans into direct contact with the states of the Isthmus; indeed, it is more than likely that Corinth, Sicyon, and Megara (and perchance Aegina) became incorporated into the network of Spartan alliances in the years succeeding the defeat of Argos, rather than in the initial half of the sixth century. The Corinthians had assuredly become Spartan allies by circa 525, witnessing their participation in the Spartan campaign to depose Polycrates as tyrant of Samos (vide Herodotus 3.39.1, 48.1). The concluding two decades of the sixth century are decisively marked by the dynamic persona of King Cleomenes of Sparta; albeit, the account of his reign (circa 520–490) is, alas, distorted by the inimical sources consulted by Herodotus. 'Twas under Cleomenes that the Spartans not only firmly established their supremacy within the Peloponnese, but also, through intervention in the affairs of other states external to the Peloponnese, came to be recognised as the pre-eminent leaders of Greece in the defence of the homeland against the Persian incursions.

Athens was to assume a leading role in Cleomenes’ designs for extending Spartan influence beyond the confines of the Peloponnese. The assassination of Hipparchus in 514 had persuaded his brother, the tyrant Hippias, that his hopes for survival as tyrant of Athens hinged upon a policy of rigorous repression. One of the foremost aristocratic families, the Alcmaeonids, endeavoured to engineer Hippias’ overthrow, an endeavour only achieved in 510 when Cleomenes deployed his Spartan army to support their aims (vide Herodotus 5.64). The Spartan expedition proceeded overland, which doth confirm that Corinth and Megara were, by this juncture, allies of Sparta, thus affording them facile access to Attica. There exists some doubt as to whether Athens now formed a military alliance upon terms identical to Sparta’s alliances within the Peloponnese; however, at the very least, Cleomenes would have anticipated the installation of a pro-Spartan, oligarchic regime to sustain Sparta’s burgeoning influence. The proposition of democratic reforms by Cleisthenes was viewed with considerable concern by Cleomenes, who intervened in 508 with a modest Spartan army, precipitating the exile of Cleisthenes and seven hundred families, and the installation of Isagoras as the leader of a narrow oligarchy.

The revolt of the Athenian demos against such an unwelcome constitution compelled Cleomenes to retire in disgrace (vide Herodotus 5.72). Cleomenes’ desire for retribution revealed Sparta’s then-current status as the leading power of Greece:

Herodotus 5.74:

Cleomenes … summoned an army from the whole of the Peloponnese, not stating the reason for its gathering, but desiring to take vengeance on the people of Athens and to establish Isagoras as tyrant.

This army did also include the Boeotians and the Chalcidians of Euboea, both of whom were allies of Sparta. This quotation is of no little interest on two accounts: firstly, the Spartan armed forces were of such puissance that the allies felt obliged to comply with their orders, notwithstanding the objective of the campaign remaining unstated; secondly, the Spartans’ claim that they expelled tyrants as a matter of principle is exposed as naught but empty rhetoric. However, this invasion of Attica in circa 506 had to be aborted at Eleusis, upon the Athenian borders, when the Corinthians withdrew upon the grounds that they were acting unjustly by assailing Athens, to be followed by Damaratus, the other Spartan king, and the remaining allies (vide Herodotus 5.75–76).

Approximately two years hence, albeit Cleomenes is not mentioned by name, the Spartans summoned a meeting of their allies and proposed the restoration in Athens of the ex-tyrant Hippias; yet this was rejected upon Corinthian counsel by all of the delegates, and the policy of launching an expedition against Athens was abandoned (vide Herodotus 5.91–93). This evolution from utter Spartan dominance over the allies in the execution of Spartan foreign policy into the ‘Peloponnesian League’ might appear, at first blush, to have weakened Sparta. In verity, a genuine partnership had been forged, wherein, because the Peloponnesian allies had been granted a safeguard against Sparta acting irresponsibly, there could subsist closer cooperation and augmented trust between the hegemon (leader) and the Peloponnesian allies. The consequence was the growth of the most formidable alliance in Greece, which, a generation later, supplied the leadership and the backbone of the forces that saved Greece from Persian conquest.