Transfer (Cognitive Learning Processes)

The matter of transfer doth constitute a subject of utmost import to the understanding of the learning process, hinging as it does upon the intricate workings of cognitive mechanisms. By 'transfer' is signified the application of knowledge in novel manners, within uncharted circumstances, or in familiar contexts yet imbued with differing subject matter. Furthermore, transfer doth elucidate how antecedent learning doth bear upon that which followeth. The phenomenon of transfer is inextricably linked with new learning, inasmuch as students bring to bear upon the situation their extant knowledge and experiential understanding germane thereto (National Research Council, 2000). The cognitive faculty for transfer is of considerable moment, for without it, all learning would be confined to the specificities of the situation at hand, and a most grievous amount of instructional time would needs be expended in the reiteration of skills within each novel context.

Diverse categories of transfer are to be discerned. 'Positive transfer' manifesteth itself when prior learning rendereth subsequent learning more facile. The acquisition of proficiency in the operation of a motor car with a standard transmission should, by this principle, expedite the learning of the operation of other such vehicles. Conversely, 'negative transfer' doth arise when prior learning impedeth or complicates subsequent learning. The learning of the standard transmission might exert a deleterious influence upon the subsequent learning of an automatic transmission, owing to the propensity to engage the spectral clutch and, perchance, to shift gears whilst the conveyance is in motion, an action fraught with the peril of irreparable damage to the transmission. 'Zero transfer' doth denote the absence of any perceptible influence of one form of learning upon that which followeth. The learning of the standard transmission should exert no discernible effect upon the learning of the operation of a calculating engine.

Current cognitive conceptualisations of learning accentuate the manifold complexities inherent in the phenomenon of transfer (Phye, 2001). Albeit certain manifestations of rudimentary skill transfer appear to occur spontaneously, the greater part of transfer demandeth higher-order cognitive faculties and convictions regarding the utility of knowledge. This discourse shall commence with a concise conspectus of historical perspectives on transfer, followed by a discussion of cognitive viewpoints and the pertinence of transfer to the scholastic pursuit of knowledge.

The Doctrine of Identical Elements

Theories of conditioning lay great stress upon the notion that transference is contingent upon the presence of identical elements, or features of marked similarity (stimuli), across diverse situations. Thorndike (1913) propounded that transference occurreth whensoever situations exhibit identical elements (stimuli) and demand responses of a like nature. A perspicuous and acknowledged relation must obtain between the original task and the task to which transference is sought, as is often the case betwixt drill or practice and the execution of homework.

This view doth possess an intuitive allure. Students, for instance, who acquire the art of solving the arithmetical problem '602 - 376 = ?' are apt to transfer this selfsame knowledge to the solving of '503 - 287 = ?'. It may, however, be enquired as to the precise constitution of these 'elements', and moreover, the degree of similarity that must exist ere they be deemed 'identical'. In the realm of subtraction, must the selfsame types of numerals needs be situated in the selfsame columns? Students possessed of the capacity to solve '42 - 37 = ?' will not, ipso facto, be enabled to solve '7428 - 2371 = ?', notwithstanding that the former problem is contained within the latter. Such findings casteth doubt upon the very validity of 'identical elements'. Furthermore, even when identical elements are indeed present, students must needs recognise them as such. Should students be of the belief that no commonality doth exist betwixt situations, then no transference shall occur. The position of 'identical elements' is, therefore, inadequate to furnish a complete explanation of all instances of transference.

The Doctrine of Mental Discipline

Of equal import to the matter of transference is the doctrine of mental discipline, which doth maintain that the study of certain subjects (e.g., mathematics, classical languages) augmenteth general mental functioning and facilitate the learning of new material to a greater extent than doth the study of other subjects. This view enjoyed considerable vogue in Thorndike’s day, and doth periodically resurface in the form of recommendations for the cultivation of basic or core skills and knowledge (e.g., Hirsch, 1987).

Researches conducted by Thorndike (1924) furnished no corroboration for the notion of mental discipline. Instead, Thorndike reached the conclusion that that which facilitateth new learning is a student's nascent level of mental ability. Students possessed of a greater degree of intelligence at the commencement of a course did derive the greatest benefit therefrom. The intellectual worth of studies doth reflect not the extent to which they improve a student's capacity for thought, but rather the manner in which they influence a student's interests and aspirations.

Generalisation

Skinner (1953) did advance yet another view of transference. According to the precepts of operant conditioning theory, transference doth involve the generalisation of responses from one discriminative stimulus to another. Thus, students might be instructed to place their books within their desks at the sounding of the bell. When students proceed to another class, the act of placing books away at the sounding of the bell might generalise to the new setting.

The concept of generalisation, much like that of identical elements, doth possess an intuitive appeal. Assuredly, some measure of transference doth occur through the medium of generalisation, and indeed, it may even occur automatically. Students who are subjected to punishment for misconduct in one class may well refrain from misconduct in other classes. Once drivers have learnt to halt their motorcars at a red light, that response will generalise to other red lights, irrespective of location, meteorological conditions, hour of the day, and so forth.

Nonetheless, the position of generalisation is not without its difficulties. As with identical elements, it may be enquired as to which features of a given situation are employed to generalise responses. Situations do share many features in common, yet we respond only to certain amongst them, whilst disregarding others. We respond to the red light, without regard for numerous other features of the situation. At the same time, we might be more inclined to disregard a red light when no other motorcars are present, or when we are pressed for time. Our response is not fixed, but rather doth depend upon our cognitive assessment of the situation. The selfsame can be said of a countless host of other situations wherein generalisation doth not occur automatically. Cognitive processes are implicated in most instances of generalisation, inasmuch as individuals determine whether the rendering of a similar response is appropriate within a given setting. The position of generalisation is, therefore, incomplete, inasmuch as it doth neglect the role of cognitive processes.

In the parlance of information processing theory, transfer doth necessitate the activation of knowledge within the networks of memory. It doth require that information be cross-referenced with propositions interlinked within memory (Anderson, 1990; Gagné et al., 1993). The more copious the interconnections betwixt fragments of information within the memory, the more probable it is that the activation of one such fragment shall cue other information stored within.

The selfsame process is implicated in the transfer of procedural knowledge and productions (Bruning et al., 2004). Transfer doth transpire when knowledge and productions are conjoined within long-term memory (LTM) with disparate content. Students must, furthermore, be of the belief that productions are of utility across a range of scenarios. Transfer is facilitated by the uses of knowledge being stored contiguously with the knowledge itself. By way of illustration, learners may possess a production for the skimming of text. This may be linked in memory with other reading procedures (e.g., identifying salient points, sequencing) and may have various applications stored alongside it (e.g., skimming the text of a web page to glean the general sense, skimming memoranda to ascertain the location and time of a meeting). The more numerous the links in LTM and the more profuse the uses stored with skimming, the more propitious the transfer. Such linkages are forged by affording students the opportunity to practice skills across diverse settings and by assisting them in comprehending the applications of knowledge.

This cognitive delineation of transfer doth accord with much of our extant understanding regarding cued knowledge. Where a greater abundance of LTM linkages are obtainable, access to information through differing avenues becomes a possibility. It may be that we are incapable of recalling the name of Aunt Martha’s dog by meditating upon her (cuing the “Aunt Martha” network), yet we might be enabled to recall the name by contemplating (cuing) breeds of canine (“collie”). Such cuing is evocative of the experiences we periodically undergo, wherein we are unable to recall a person’s name until we consider that person from an alternative vantage or within a disparate context.

Concomitantly, we remain ignorant of many of the nuances concerning the formation of such linkages. Connections are not automatically established merely through the act of delineating the uses of knowledge to students or by having them rehearse skills across varying contexts (National Research Council, 2000). Diverse forms of transfer exist, each governed by its own peculiar set of conditions.

Research doth indicate that transfer is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather a complex matter (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). A distinction may be drawn 'twixt near and far transfer (Royer, 1986). Near transfer occurreth when situations overlap a great deal, such as between the stimulus elements during instruction and those present in the transfer situation. An example be when fraction skills art taught and then students art tested on the content in the selfsame format in which 't wast taught. In contrast, far transfer involveth a transfer context much different from that in which original learning occurred. An example wouldst be applying fraction skills in an entirely different setting without explicitly being told to doth so. Thus, students might has't to add parts of a recipe (1/2 cup milk and 1/4 cup water) to determine the amount of liquid without being told the task involveth fractions.

Another distinction be 'twixt literal and figural transfer. Literal transfer involveth transfer of an intact skill or knowledge to a new task (Royer, 1986). Literal transfer occurreth when students useth fraction skills in and out of school. Figural transfer referreth to using some aspect of our general knowledge to bethink or learn about a particular problem. Figural transfer oft involveth using analogies, metaphors, or comparable situations. Figural transfer occurreth when students encounter new learning and employ the selfsame study strategies yond they didst useth to master prior learning in a related area. Figural transfer requireth drawing an analogy between the old and new situations and transferring that general knowledge to the new situation.

Though some overlap exists, the forms of transfer involveth different types of knowledge. Near transfer and literal transfer involveth primarily declarative knowledge and mastery of basic skills. Far transfer and figurative transfer involveth declarative and procedural knowledge, as well as conditional knowledge concerning the types of situations in which the knowledge may proveth useful (Royer, 1986).

Salomon and Perkins (1989) distinguished low-road from high-road transfer. Low-road transfer referreth to transfer of well-established skills in a spontaneous and haply automatic fashion. In contrast, high-road transfer is abstract and mindful; 't “involveth the explicit conscious formulation of abstraction in one situation that alloweth making a connection to another” (Salomon & Perkins, 1989, p. 118).

Low-road transfer occurreth with skills and actions yond has't been practiced extensively in varied contexts. The behaviours tend to becometh performed automatically in response to characteristics of a situation yond art similar to those of the situation in which they wert acquired. Examples art learning to drive a car and then driving a different but similar car, brushing one’s teeth with a regular toothbrush and with an electric toothbrush, or solving algebra problems at school and at home. At times the transfer may occur with little conscious awareness of what one is doing. The level of cognitive activity increaseth when some aspect of the situation differeth and requireth attention. Thus, most people has't little trouble accommodating to features in rental cars. At which hour features differ (e.g., the headlight control works differently or is in a different position from what one is used to), people has't to learneth those folk.

High-road transfer occurreth when students learneth a rule, principle, prototype, schema, and so forth, and then useth 't in a moo general sense than how they learned 't. Transfer is mindful because students doth not apply the rule automatically. Rather, they examine the new situation and decideth what strategies wilt beest useful to apply. Abstraction is involved during learning and later at which hour students perceiveth basic elements in the new problem or situation and decideth to apply the skill, behaviour, or strategy. Low-road transfer primarily involveth declarative knowledge, and high-road transfer useth productions and conditional knowledge to a greater extent.

Salomon and Perkins (1989) distinguished two types of high-road transfer—forward reaching and backward reaching—according to whither the transfer originates. Forward-reaching transfer occurreth when one abstracteth behaviour and cognitions from the learning context to one or more potential transfer contexts. F'r example, while students art studying precalculus, they might bethink about how some of the material (e.g., limits) might beest pertinent in calculus. Another example is while being taught in a class how a parachute works, students might bethink about how they wilt useth the parachute in actually jumping from an airplane.

Forward-reaching transfer is proactive and requireth self-monitoring of potential contexts and useth of skills and knowledge. To determine potential useth of precalculus, f'r example, learners must beest familiar with other content knowledge of potential contexts in which knowledge might beest useful. Forward-reaching transfer is unlikely when students has't little knowledge about potential transfer contexts.

In backward-reaching transfer, students abstracteth in the transfer context features of the situation that alloweth f'r integration with previously learned ideas (Salomon & Perkins, 1989). While students art working on a calculus problem, they might tryeth to bethink of any situations in precalculus yond couldst beest useful f'r solving the calculus problem. Students who has't difficulty learning new material employ backward-reaching transfer when they bethink back to other times at which hour they didst experience difficulty and asketh what they didst doth in those situations (e.g., seeketh help from friends, go to the library, reread the text, talketh with the teacher). They then might beest apt to implement one of those solutions in hopes of remedying their current difficulty. Analogical reasoning might involveth backward-reaching transfer, as students apply steps from the original problem to the current one. Consistent with the effects of analogical reasoning on learning, Gentner, Loewenstein, and Thompson (2003) didst findeth yond analogical reasoning enhanced transfer, especially when two original cases wert presented together.

Earlier we didst note yond transfer involveth linked information in LTM such yond the activation of one item can cue other items. Presumably low-road transfer is characterized by relatively automatic cuing. A central distinction between the two forms is degree of mindful abstraction, or the volitional, metacognitively guided employment of nonautomatic processes (Salomon & Perkins, 1989). Mindful abstraction requireth yond learners not simply acteth based on the first possible response, but rather yond they examine situational cues, define alternative strategies, gather information, and seeketh new connections between information. LTM cuing is not automatic with high-road transfer but rather deliberate, and can result in links being formed in LTM as individuals bethink of new ways to relate knowledge and contexts.

Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1996) contended yond transfer is moo likely at which hour learners attend to the cues yond signalleth the appropriateness of using a particular skill. They then wilt beest moo apt to notice those folk cues on transfer tasks and employ the skill. In this sense, the learning and transfer tasks shareth symbolic elements. These shared elements art important in strategy transfer.

Transfer, as a notion, doth apply not merely to skills and knowledge, but also to strategies (Phye, 2001). It is a most regrettable finding of much scholarly inquiry that students, having learned strategies and applied them with a measure of effectiveness, do nonetheless fail to maintain their employment over time, or to generalise them beyond the immediate instructional setting. This is a commonplace issue encountered in matters of problem-solving (Jonassen & Hung, 2006). Manifold are the factors that impede the transfer of strategies, including a lack of comprehension that the strategy is apposite for diverse settings, a failure to understand how to modify its application with varying content, a belief that the strategy is not as efficacious for performance as other factors (e.g., the time available), a supposition that the strategy requires undue effort, or a dearth of opportunity to apply the strategy with novel material (Borkowski & Cavanaugh, 1979; Dempster & Corkill, 1999; Paris et al., 1983; Pressley et al., 1990; Schunk, 1991; Schunk & Rice, 1993).

Phye (1989, 1990, 1992, 2001; Phye & Sanders, 1992, 1994) hath developed a model of utility for enhancing the transfer of strategies, and hath conducted research testing its effectiveness. During the initial acquisition phase, learners receive instruction and practice, inclusive of an assessment of their metacognitive awareness of the uses of the strategy. A subsequent retention phase comprises further practice on training materials and measures of recall. The third phase, being that of transfer, occurreth when participants attempt to solve new problems that present differing surface characteristics, but which necessitate the same solution strategy as was practised during training. Phye didst also lay stress upon the role of learner motivation for transfer, and upon methods for enhancing motivation by demonstrating to learners the uses of knowledge. Motivation is a critical influence upon transfer (National Research Council, 2000; Pugh & Bergin, 2006).

In one particular study, wherein adults engaged with verbal analogy problems, some received corrective feedback during trials, consisting of the identification of correct solutions, whilst others were furnished with advice concerning the method of solving analogies. All students did judge their confidence in the correctness of the solutions they generated. During the training period, corrective feedback proved superior to advice in promoting the transfer of problem-solving skills; however, upon a delayed transfer task, no material difference was observed between the conditions. Irrespective of condition, confidence in problem-solving capabilities bore a positive relation to actual performance.

The transfer of problem-solving strategies doth require knowledge of the strategy itself, coupled with conditional knowledge of the uses of said strategy, which is facilitated when learners explicate the strategy as they acquire it (Crowley & Siegler, 1999). Furthermore, feedback concerning the manner in which the strategy aids in improving performance doth facilitate strategy retention and transfer (Phye & Sanders, 1994; Schunk & Swartz, 1993a, 1993b). Phye’s research doth highlight the link between strategy transfer and information processing, and the key roles played by practice, corrective feedback, and motivation. It doth also underscore the salient point that the teaching of self-regulated learning strategies to students can facilitate transfer (Fuchs et al., 2003a; Fuchs, Fuchs, Finelli, Courey, & Hamlett, 2004).

Albeit divers forms of transfer may be disparate, they oft work in concert. Whilst labouring at a task, some behaviours may transfer automatically whereas others may require mindful application. For instance, assume that Mr. Jeff be inditing a short paper. In pondering the organisation, Mr. Jeff might employ high-road, backward-reaching transfer by considering how he organised papers in previous, similar circumstances. Many aspects o' the task, including word choice and spellings, shall occur automatically (low-road transfer). As Mr. Jeff indites, he also might consider how this information could prove useful in other settings. Thus, if the paper be on some aspect o' the Civil War, Mr. Jeff might consider how to utilise this knowledge in history class. Messrs. Salomon and Perkins cited another example involving chess masters, who accumulate a repertoire o' configurations from years o' play. Albeit some o' these may be executed automatically, expert play dependeth on mindfully analysing play and potential moves. 'Tis strategic and involveth high-road transfer.

In some situations, low-road transfer could involve a good degree o' mindfulness. With regard to strategy transfer, even minor variations in formats, contexts, or requirements can maketh transfer problematic among students, especially among those who experience learning problems (Borkowski & Cavanaugh, 1979). Conversely, some uses o' analogical reasoning can occur with little conscious effort if the analogy be relatively clear. A good rule be ne'er to taketh transfer for granted; 't must be directly addressed.

This raiseth the issue o' how teachers might encourage transfer in students. A major goal o' teaching be to promote long-term retention and transfer (Halpern & Hakel, 2003). We know that having students practice skills in varied contexts and ensuring that they understand different uses for knowledge buildeth links in LTM (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996). Homework be a mechanism for transfer because students practice and refine, at home, skills learned in school. Research showeth a positive relation between homework and student achievement with the relation being stronger in grades 7–12 than in grades K–6 (Cooper, Robinson, & Patall, 2006).

But students do not automatically transfer strategies for the reasons noted earlier. Practice addresseth some o' these concerns, but not others. Mr. Cox (1997) recommended that as students learn in many contexts, they should determine what they haveth in common. More complex skills, such as comprehension and problem solving, shall probably benefit most from this situated cognition approach (Griffin, 1995). Motivation should be addressed (Pugh & Bergin, 2006). Teachers may need to provide students with explicit motivational feedback that linketh strategy use with improved performance and provideth information about how the strategy shall prove useful in that setting. Studies show that such motivational feedback enhanceth strategy use, academic performance, and self-efficacy for performing well (Schunk & Rice, 1993). At the Nikowsky Middle School, teachers combined cognitive strategy instruction with motivational factors to enhance students’ problem solving.

Establishing academic goals (another motivational variable), the attainment o' which requireth careful deliberation and use o' available resources, also should help students. By cuing students at appropriate times, teachers may help them use relevant knowledge in new ways. Teachers might ask a question such as, “What doth thou know that might help thee in this situation?” Such cuing tendeth to be associated with greater generation o' ideas. Teachers can serve as models for transfer. Modeling strategies that bring related knowledge to bear on a new situation encourageth students to seek ways to enhance transfer in both forward- and backward-reaching fashion and feeleth more efficacious about doing so. Labouring with children in grades 3–5 during mathematical problem solving, Rittle-Johnson (2006) found that having children explain how answers were arrived at and whether they were correct promoted transfer o' problem-solving strategies.